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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
GARY LEE MOODY, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20110518-CA 
Appellant is incarcerated. 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction for one count of exploitation of a 
vulnerable adult, a third degree felony, see Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-11 l(4)(b)(ii), and one 
count of issuing a bad check or draft, a third degree felony, see Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-
505 (1) (Supp. 2007), in the Third Judicial District, in and for Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah, the Honorable Randall Skanchy presiding. R. 176-77. See Addendum A (Sentence, 
Judgment, Commitment). This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-
4-103(2)(e) (Supp. 2009). 
ISSUES, STANDARD OF REVIEW, AND PRESERVATION 
Issue: Insufficient Evidence: Did the trial court err when it denied Mr. Moody's 
motion for a directed verdict where the State presented insufficient evidence to prove Mr. 
Moody guilty of issuing a bad check or draft? 
Standard of Review/Preservation: When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence 
supporting a conviction, this Court will reverse the conviction when the evidence, viewed 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
"in the light most favorable to the verdict, is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently 
improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant committed the crime of which he was convicted." State v. Hirschi, 2007 UT 
App 255, Tf 15, 167 P.3d 503 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see also 
State v. Quada, 918 P.2d 883, 887 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (citing State v. Marcum, 750 
P.2d 599, 601 (Utah 1988)). This issue was preserved. R. 194:184-85 (because the State 
has failed to present sufficient evidence that Mr. Moody wrote the checks for the 
"purpose of obtaining money from Wells Fargo," and because the evidence showed Mr. 
Moody was forthcoming with Mr. Christensen that there were no funds from which to 
cash the check, defense counsel moved for "a directed verdict [of] acquittal"). 
Issue: Inadmissible Evidence: Did the court err when it admitted the testimony of 
Casey Nelson, Mr. Moody's parole officer, indicating that Mr. Moody violated probation, 
failed to inform his parole officer he was investing in a product called Medsonix, and that 
Mr. Moody had been involved in a similar crime because the testimony was irrelevant 
and unduly prejudicial, making it inadmissible under Utah's Rules of Evidence? 
Standard of Review/Preservation: Although evidentiary issues are reviewed for an 
abuse of discretion, State v. Althoff 2006 UT 48, ^  4, 147 P.3d 1187, the trial court's 
"selection, interpretation, and application" of any particular rule of evidence is reviewed 
for correctness. Dalebout v. Union Pac. R.R, Co., 1999 UT App 151, ^ 20, 980 P.2d 1194 
(citation omitted); State v. Levin, 2006 UT 50, ^ 46, 144 P.3d 1096. This issue was 
preserved. R. 194:3-7 (motion to exclude the testimony of Mr. Nelson because it was 
2 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
"irrelevant"), 178-79 (defense counsel moves for mistrial following Mr. Nelson's 
testimony). 
STATUTES AND RULES 
The following provisions are relevant to the issues on appeal. Their text is 
provided in full in Addendum B. 
Utah Code. Ann. § 76-5-11 l(4)(b)(ii) (exploitation of a vulnerable adult); 
Utah Code. Ann. § 76-6-505 (1) (issuing a bad check or draft); and 
Utah Rules of Evidence 401, 402, 403, and 404(b). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On January 27, 2010, the State charged Mr. Moody with exploitation of a 
vulnerable adult, theft by deception, and issuing a bad check or draft. R. 1-2; 194:2. On 
April 6, 2010, the State amended the information dropping the charge of theft by 
deception. R. 22-23. A copy of the amended information is attached hereto as Addendum 
C 
Before the trial, Mr. Moody moved to preclude the State from introducing 
testimony from Mr. Moody's parole officer, Casey Nelson, based on its irrelevant and 
unduly prejudicial nature. R. 194:3-7, 11. Mr. Moody moved to prevent the State from 
introducing testimony that he never told Mr. Nelson about the Medsonix invention. R. 
194:4. The trial court denied the motion. R. 194:7. 
Mr. Moody also moved for the trial court to preclude evidence of his prior 
convictions. R. 84-89; 194:7. The trial court granted that motion stating that, "the issues 
3 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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associated with [Mr. Moody's] prior convictions won't be subject to disclosure during the 
course of the trial." R. 194:8-10. 
A jury trial was held on March 23, 2011. R. 194. During the State's case-in-chief, 
the State introduced testimony from Mr. Nelson, over Mr. Moody's renewed objection, 
R. 194:4, 178, that one of the conditions of Mr. Moody's parole was "[n]ot to handle 
investment money." R. 194:175. Mr. Nelson explained that borrowing twenty dollars and 
agreeing to pay interest would be considered a violation of his probation agreement. R. 
194:179. Mr. Nelson elaborated that he monitored Mr. Moody's investments and 
employment because, for example, "if someone has a no alcohol clause, they can't get a 
job at a bar and likewise if any other crimes that would put them in a position to re-offend 
to a similar crime." R. 194:176. The court denied a motion for a mistrial following Mr. 
Nelson's testimony. R. 194:178-79. 
At the close of the State's case, Mr. Moody moved for directed verdicts based on 
insufficient evidence, which were denied. R. 194:183-88. Mr. Moody did not testify. R. 
194:182. At the conclusion of trial, the jury found Mr. Moody guilty as charged. R. 176. 
On May 9, 2011, the court imposed a sentence of concurrent prison terms not to 
exceed five years in the Utah State Prison. R. 183-84. On June 6, 2011 Mr. Moody filed a 
timely notice of appeal. R. 189. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Grant Christensen, a retired dentist, met with Gary Moody and his brother Steven 
Moody at Mr. Christensen's home on March 19, 2009. R. 194: 112-13, 168-69. Mr. 
Christensen knew the Moody family through his connection to Delta, Utah, and was 
4 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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acquainted with Mr. Moody prior to the meeting. R. 194:171. Mr. Moody explained that 
he was involved with a project called Medsonix, an invention he had mentioned to Mr. 
Christensen when he was still working as a dentist, R. 194:172, that would clean oil and 
water and would also have medical uses. R. 194:169-70. Mr. Moody indicated that if Mr. 
Christensen "put up some money," Mr. Moody would use it for banking and legal 
expenses, eventually repaying Mr. Christensen double the amount of the loan. R. 
194:170-71, 159. 
Mr. Christensen's wife, Jeanne Christensen, testified that she counted twenty 
instances between March 2009 and December 2009 where Mr. Moody visited the home 
and obtained money from Mr. Christensen. R. 194:105, 111. According to Mrs. 
Christensen, who kept a calendar of Mr. Moody's visits, Mr. Christensen gave a total of 
$3,050 in cash to Mr. Moody and also gave him three checks that totaled $1,030. 
R.194:121. 
Mr. Moody's brother, Steven, testified that during the time Mr. Moody was in 
contact with Mr. Christensen, Mr. Moody was also approaching members of the Moody 
family and asking for loans that he would use towards Medsonix, an invention involving 
oil wells. R. 194:164-65. Steven Moody testified that Mr. Moody used the money he 
obtained for "banking and legal, [and] other business expenses." R. 194:159, 166-67. 
Mrs. Christensen told her husband they needed "to have something to show that 
you're paying this cash out." R. 194:122. Mrs. Christensen wrote out a promissory note 
on August 11, 2009, indicating that Mr. Moody was to repay Mr. Christensen $760 by 
August 15, 2009. R. 194:124, 178 (State's Exhibit 6). Mr. Moody signed the note. R. 
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194:123. Mrs. Christensen stated at trial that the sum of $760 did not reflect the amount 
actually borrowed, but she "just wanted to get something on paper to get Gary's signature 
on it with a date and a promise to pay back" the money Mr. Christensen had loaned him. 
R. 194:122. 
Mr. Moody later gave Mr. Christensen two checks, but clarified that they were 
"good faith checks," because he did not have money in the account. R. 194:125. He 
instructed the Christensens to "hold them and I'll let you know when I can cover them." 
R. 194:125. The first check was dated August 15, 2009, for $930, and the second was 
dated August 17, 2009, for $600. R. 194:126. The checks were labeled "loan payment" 
and "loan" on the bottom. R. 194:146. Mr. Moody continued to tell the Christensens not 
to cash the checks because there was no money in the account, but Mrs. Christensen took 
the checks to the bank in late October or early November. R. 194:127-28. The bank was 
unable to cash the checks and returned them to Mrs. Christensen. R. 194:128. The 
Christensens stated at trial that they never received any money from Mr. Moody. R. 
194:129, 172. 
After the State called Jeanne Christensen, Steven Moody, and Grant Christensen 
as witnesses, it called Casey Nelson over Mr. Moody's renewed objection. R: 194:4, 178. 
Mr. Nelson is an agent for Adult Probation and Parole and was assigned to supervise Mr. 
Moody in March of 2009. R. 194:173-74. Mr, Nelson testified that one of the conditions 
of Mr. Moody's parole was "not to handle investment money." R. 194:175. Borrowing 
twenty dollars and agreeing to pay interest, for example, would be considered a violation. 
R. 194:179. Mr. Nelson testified that he monitored Mr. Moody's investments and 
6 
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employment, analogizing that "if someone has a no alcohol clause, they can't get a job at 
a bar and likewise if any other crimes that would put them in a position to re-offend to a 
similar crime." R. 194:176. According to Mr. Nelson's testimony, Mr. Moody owed 
$297,000 to the state in restitution for a prior criminal offense and was delinquent on the 
payments. R. 194:177-78. Mr. Nelson stated that Mr. Moody did not report borrowing 
money or becoming involved with the Medsonix device. R. 194:176. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial judge erred in denying a motion for directed verdict for count two, 
issuing a bad check or draft, because the State failed to present sufficient evidence that 
Mr. Moody wrote the checks "for the purpose of obtaining from any person . . . any 
money, property, or other thing of value or paying for any services, wages, salary, labor 
or rent . . . " as required by statute. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-505 (Supp. 2007). The 
marshaled evidence demonstrates that Mr. Moody wrote the checks for the purpose of 
providing the Christensens a good faith promise to pay antecedent debts when he had 
funds in the account. R. 194:144, 146. Mr. Moody was clear with the Christensens that 
the checks could not be cashed and did not provide the checks in quid pro quo exchange 
for anything of value. R. 194:125. The checks caused no harm or detrimental reliance to 
Mr. Christensen, nor did the checks induce Mr. Christensen to give anything to Mr. 
Moody. Mr. Moody did not benefit by writing the checks. Writing good faith checks as a 
"loan repayment" for an antecedent debt, while making clear that the account does not 
have money, does not constitute a criminal offense under Utah Code section 76-6-505. 
Because the evidence did not establish that Mr. Moody wrote the checks for the purpose 
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of obtaining money, property or other things of value from Mr. Christensen, the felony 
conviction under count two should be reversed. 
Second, this Court should reverse because the trial court erred when it denied Mr. 
Moody's motion to exclude the irrelevant and unduly prejudicial testimony of Mr. 
Moody's parole officer. The evidence regarding Mr. Moody's previous conviction of a 
similar offense, current status as a parolee, violation of his parole when he borrowed 
investment money, failure to inform the parole officer of his involvement with the 
Medsonix device, and failure to make payments on the State's restitution order was not 
relevant to whether the Medsonix device existed or whether Mr. Moody deceived a 
vulnerable adult. Additionally, the State had other evidence to show that Mr. Moody was 
behind in restitution payments. Moreover, Mr. Nelson's testimony was unduly 
prejudicial, and the prejudice caused by highlighting previous criminal activity and 
explaining that Mr. Moody was currently on parole substantially outweighed any minimal 
probative value of the testimony. Admission of this testimony violated the rules of 
evidence and Mr. Moody's right to a fair trial. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE MR. MOODY9S CONVICTION 
BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT DENIED MR. 
MOODY'S MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT. 
The State failed to proffer any evidence that Mr. Moody issued the checks for the 
purpose of obtaining something of value. Where the marshaled evidence shows that Mr. 
Moody manifested no intent to issue the checks to obtain anything, received nothing in 
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exchange for the checks, and wrote the checks only as payment on an antecedent debt, 
the elements of the offense are not met and this Court must reverse the conviction. 
A. TO SUSTAIN A CONVICTION FOR ISSUING A BAD CHECK OR 
DRAFT, THE STATE WAS REQUIRED TO PROVIDE EVIDENCE 
THAT THE CHECKS WERE ISSUED FOR THE PURPOSE OF 
OBTAINING SOMETHING OF VALUE. 
To support a conviction of "issuing a bad check or draft," the State was required to 
provide sufficient evidence that Mr. Moody issued the checks "for the purpose of 
obtaining from any person . . . or corporation, any money, property, or other thing of 
value or paying for any services, wages, salary, labor, or rent, knowing it would not be 
paid by the drawee." Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-505 ("bad check" statute). The State failed 
to do so. To violate Utah Code section 76-6-505, an actor must pass or issue a knowingly 
unfunded check for the purpose of obtaining something of value in exchange. 
Accordingly, "the passing of the bad check must bear the hallmarks of a quidpro quo for 
money, property, or some other thing of value." State v. Robison, 2006 UT 65, ^  36, 147 
P.3d 448 (passing a bad check to obtain title to a truck); State v. Wallace, 2006 UT App 
232, Tflf 3-4, 138 P.3d 599 (passing unfunded check for the purpose of obtaining airline 
tickets). In other words, there must be some "understanding" between transacting parties 
that the check is issued "in exchange for" a thing of value. Robison, 2006 UT 65, fflf 39-
40 ("[i]f the check is issued in exchange for a thing of value, then the statute applies."). 
In contrast, where checks are issued to pay an antecedent debt, not to induce the 
recipient to provide something of value in return, and in fact improve the recipient's 
position in relation to the debtor, there is no quid pro quo and no violation of Utah Code 
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Ann. § 76-6-505. Id Tj 38 (quoting Howells, Inc. v. Nelson, 565 P.2d 1147, 1149 (Utah 
1977)). For example, in Howells, the defendant wrote a dishonored check as payment on 
a past due account. 565 P.2d at 1149. The court held that payment of an antecedent debt 
was qualitatively different from a payment made for something of value because the 
plaintiff "was not induced to give anything of value, nor was it in any way cheated or 
adversely affected by the giving of the check." Id. (distinguishing a business exchange 
from a debt repayment for purpose of violating Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-505). The court 
concluded that, in fact, passing the unfunded checks to pay on a past due account "could 
be regarded as having improved the plaintiffs position by raising the form of the [debt] 
obligation one step in dignity as plaintiff would then have its choice of suing on the 
check, or on the account" in civil court. Id (emphasis added) (where the parties "are 
aware that there are not funds presently available to pay a check and it is . . . agreed to be 
held . . . it is properly regarded as a promise to pay in the future."). 
Similarly, in State v. Mower, 2005 UT App 438, Tj 14, 124 P.3d 265, this Court 
held that a check granting a loan is different from passing an unfunded check as payment 
on an antecedent debt because it qualified as a quid pro quo exchange. The defendant in 
that case was in the business of providing short-term loans if the borrower provided a 
vehicle as collateral. Id. 112. The defendant provided a loan check supported by 
insufficient funds to a client. 1 4 1 3. This Court noted that the defendant passed a bad 
check "for the purpose of obtaining" something of value because the defendant's 
"assignable legal right to collect $4900 plus interest and/or fees has some immediate 
value," and he "could have immediately sold the loan for whatever the secondary market 
10 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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would bear." Id. ^ 14 n.2. Moreover, the security interest he expected to receive through a 
vehicle title was "an additional thing of value to be obtained by [the defendant] through 
the issuance of the check." Id. *| 15. 
Recently, this Court clarified that an agreement to hold a check for a period of 
time does not "remove[] [the instrument] from the [legal] definition of check" such that 
the "bad check" statute is inapplicable. Wallace, 2006 UT App 232, ffif 14, 16. However, 
the overriding concern and an essential element needed to support a conviction for 
violation of Utah's "bad check" statute is whether there was a quid pro quo exchange of 
the check for a thing of value. For example, in Wallace, the defendant paid for eleven 
airline tickets to Hawaii with an unfunded check, informing the travel agent at Morris 
Murdock that she would postdate the check for the following week so that she could 
deposit funds to cover the check. Id. f 3. Although the defendant did not in fact postdate 
the check, the travel agent waited to cash it because she learned through correspondence 
with the defendant over the next several weeks that the money was still not available. Id. 
1f 4. The defendant did not contend that she had not written the check for the purpose of 
obtaining the tickets, but argued that an agreement to hold the check before cashing it 
"removes it from the definition of a check." Id. ]f 14. This Court disagreed stating that 
because the check "was predated and contained no express conditions to payment on its 
face," it fell under the legal definition of a check and therefore the "bad check" statute 
was applicable. Id. ^ | 19-20. Where there was a quid pro quo business transaction—an 
unfunded check exchanged for airline tickets—the defendant violated the bad check 
statute. 
11 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Other jurisdictions interpreting similar "bad check" statutes that require a 
quid pro quo exchange as an element of the offense also conclude that unfunded 
checks for payment on a preexisting debt are not criminal. See, e.g., Hoytv. 
Hoffman, 416 P.2d 232, 233 (Nev. 1966). For example, in Hoyt, the Nevada 
Supreme Court, in interpreting Nevada's "bad check" statute, stated that "[w]here 
a so-called cold check statute makes provision only for a drawer who receives 
something of value in exchange for his check, it is not applicable for pre-existing 
debt situations." Id1 The case involved a meat retailer who purchased meat from a 
wholesaler on an open account for approximately a year. Id at 232. When the 
retailer provided the wholesaler with a check for the amount on the account, the 
check was returned for lack of funds. Id. at 232-33. The Nevada Supreme Court 
reversed the conviction and concluded that "[s]uch statutes are designed to charge 
a defendant who obtains a benefit as a result of the check." Id at 233; see also 
Commonwealth v. Goren, 893 N.E.2d 786, 789-90 (Mass. App. Ct. 2008) (holding 
that checks for antecedent debts are different than checks to obtain money or 
property or services and noting that this holding is "in accord with the vast 
majority of States that have considered the question"). A debtor who writes the 
lender an unfunded check does little more than reduce the amount he owes into 
1
 Nevada's "bad check" statute provides: "a person who willfully, with intent to 
defraud, draws or passes a check or draft to obtain: (a) Money; (b) Delivery of 
other valuable property; (c) Services; (d) The use of property . . . when the person 
has insufficient money, property or credit with the drawee of the instrument to pay 
it in full upon its presentation, is guilty of a misdemeanor." Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 
205.130 (West 2011) (the current version of the statute is similar in substance to 
the version analyzed in Hoyt). 
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writing while someone who exchanges an unfunded check for airline tickets, a 
vehicle title, or collateral benefits from the transaction at the expense of another. 
Hence, a person who does not receive a benefit from issuing an unfunded check 
cannot be convicted of issuing a bad check. 
B. THE STATE'S EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO PROVE MR. 
MOODY ISSUED THE CHECKS FOR THE PURPOSE OF 
RECEIVING SOMETHING OF VALUE AS A QUID PRO QUO. 
When reviewing a case for sufficiency of the evidence, this Court will "view the 
evidence in a light most favorable to the jury verdict,5' and "reverse only if the evidence 
is so inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime." State v. Gonzales, 2000 UT 
App 136, U 10, 2 P.3d 954 (citations and quotations marks omitted); see also State v. 
Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, ffif 18, 40, 70 P.3d 111 ("If the State fails to produce 'believable 
evidence of all the elements of the crime charged,' the trial court must dismiss the 
charges." (quoting State v. Clark, 2001 UT 9,1j 13, 20 P.3d 300)). Believable evidence is 
evidence that is "capable of supporting a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." 
Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, Tj 41 (quotation marks and citation omitted). This Court, however, 
"'will not make speculative leaps across gaps in the evidence."5 Gonzales, 2000 UT App 
136, Tf 10 (citations omitted). '"Every element of the crime charged must be proven 
beyond a reasonable doubt."5 Id. (citation omitted); see also State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 
74,1J18, 10P.3d346. 
To show insufficient evidence supported his conviction, a defendant "must 
marshal the evidence in support of the verdict and then demonstrate that the evidence is 
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insufficient when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict." State v. Boyd, 2001 
UT 30, TI13, 25 P.3d 985 (citations and quotation marks omitted). The marshaled 
evidence is as follows: 
1. Between March and December of 2009, Mr. Moody visited Mr. Christensen's 
home and borrowed money from Mr. Christensen. R. 194:105. Mr. Moody said 
the money would be used towards and invested in Medsonix, a project that would 
be used in mining and medical technology, and indicated that Mr. Christensen 
could expect a return of double the money he loaned. R. 194:160, 163, 169-71. 
Mr. Christensen gave a total of $3,050 in cash and $1,030 in checks to Mr. Moody 
over approximately twenty visits. R. 194: 105, 121. Mr. Christensen never 
received any money from Mr. Moody. R. 194:129, 172 
2. Mrs. Christensen wanted Mr. Moody to pay back some of the money he had 
borrowed. R. 194:122-24, 146. Mr. Moody signed a promissory note on August 
11, 2009, for $760 to be repaid by August 15, 2009, or thereafter to accrue 5% 
interest annually. Id.; see also State's ex. 6. Mrs. Christensen wrote out the note 
because she wanted something in writing to document the fact that Mr. 
Christensen was giving Mr. Moody money. R. 194:122, 124. The amount of the 
promissory note did not reflect the total amount borrowed, which Mrs. 
Christensen's calendar indicated was $2,530 ($1,600 cash and $930 in checks) on 
the date he wrote the promissory note. R. 194:122, 124; State's ex. 5. 
3. Mr. Moody wrote two checks labeled "loan" and "loan payment" to Mr. 
Christensen. R. 194:125-26, 146; State's ex. 7, 8. The first, for $930, was dated 
August 15, 2009, and the second, for $600, was dated August 17, 2009. R. 
194:126. According to Mrs. Christensen's calendar, Mr. Moody had borrowed 
$2,830 ($1,900 in cash and $930 in checks) from Mr. Christensen at the time he 
wrote the checks. See State's ex. 5. 
4. Mr. Moody originally told Mrs. Christensen she could cash the checks within a 
week to ten days. R. 194:144-45. Mr. Moody later told the Christensens the 
account did not have the money to cover the checks and advised them not to try to 
cash the checks. R. 194:125. Thereafter, Mr. Moody never gave the Christensens 
clearance to cash the checks. R. 194:126. 
5. Although Mr. Moody did not receive money from Mr. Christensen on the dates 
that he issued the loan payment checks, Mr. Moody subsequently received money 
from Mr. Christensen on August 25, 2009; August 28, 2009; September 30, 2009; 
October 14, 2009; October 27, 2009; November 13, 2009; and November 24, 
2009. State's ex. 5. 
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6. Mrs. Christensen took the checks to the bank on or before November 1, 2009, and 
was told the account did not have the funds to cover the checks. R. 194:127-28. 
Mr. Moody's Wells Fargo account was closed on November 9, 2009, with a zero 
balance. R. 194:130. The account had been opened on August 12, 2009 in Mr. 
Moody's name but no money was ever deposited therein before its closure on 
November 9, 2009. R. 194:130. 
After marshaling the evidence and drawing inferences in the light most favorable 
to the jury's verdict, it is clear that the checks were written as promises to pay on an 
antecedent debt. Mr. Moody did not issue the checks for the purpose of obtaining 
anything of value and Mr. Christensen did not rely on the checks when he decided to give 
Mr. Moody money. The checks caused no detriment to Mr. Christensen and fell outside 
of the criminal conduct proscribed by Utah Code section 76-6-505. 
The checks Mr. Moody wrote, which had "loan" and "loan payment" written in 
the memo line, see R. 194:146; State's ex. 7, 8, were intended as a promise to repay an 
antecedent debt and were not intended to induce Mr. Christensen to give up anything of 
value. See Robison, 2006 UT 65, If 38. Mr. Christensen first loaned Mr. Moody money in 
March and, according to Mrs. Christensen, Mr. Moody owed Mr. Christensen more than 
the amount of money written on the checks. R. 194:113-14, 149. Mr. Christensen gave 
Mr. Moody the money in exchange for oral assurances of repayment. The previous series 
of loans were therefore exchanged for a debt with the expectation that Mr. Moody would 
make payments as the investment yielded results. Mr. Christensen could not have 
premised these earlier investment transactions on receiving the unfunded checks because 
there was no mention of promissory notes or checks until Mrs. Christensen suggested it 
would be a good idea to get something from Mr. Moody in writing on August 11, 2009. 
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See R. 194:122, 124. Mrs. Christensen in fact testified that the checks were "probably 
meant" to pay back funds that Mr. Christensen had given to Mr. Moody in the past, not as 
a quid pro quo for money. R. 194: 148-49, 153; see Robison, 2006 UT 65, ^  36. 
Likewise, no subsequent loans were given in exchange for the checks. Mr. Moody 
was clear that there was no money in the account. R. 194:125-26. The fact that Mr. 
Moody specifically told Mr. Christensen that the account did not have money and asked 
that the checks be held is relevant, not because it removes the checks from the legal 
definition of checks, see Wallace, 2006 UT App 232, ffif 19-20, but because it further 
indicates that Mr. Moody negated any possibility he was passing the checks for the 
purpose of obtaining something of value in exchange for the loan payment checks. 
Furthermore, Mr. Christensen continued to loan Mr. Moody money after Mrs. 
Christensen went to the bank and confirmed that the checks could not be cashed. R. 
194:115 (Mrs. Christensen attempted to cash the checks in late October or November 1), 
128 (Mr. Moody received money on October 14, October 27, November 13, and 
November 24). 
Mr. Christensen was not "cheated or adversely affected by the giving of the 
check[s]. As a matter of fact, it could be regarded as having improved [Mr. 
Christensen5 s] position by raising the form of the obligation one step in dignity" as Mr. 
Christensen would be able to sue on the promissory note and the checks in civil court. 
See HoweUs, 565 P.2d at 1149 (footnote omitted); R. 194:122. Although an agreement to 
hold a check provided for a quid pro quo does not preclude a violation of section 76-6-
505, Utah law is clear that an unfunded check on a preexisting debt is not a violation 
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where, as in this case, the recipient "'was not induced to give anything of value, nor was 
it in any way cheated or adversely affected by the giving of the check."5 Robison, 2006 
UT 64, If 38 (quoting Howells, 565 P.2d at 1149). Like the Nevada wholesaler in Hovt 
Mr. Christensen had loaned Mr. Moody the money in exchange for the declaration that it 
would be repaid months before the checks were even suggested; the checks caused no 
damage or injury. See Hovt 416 P.2d at 233. Instead of causing injury, Mr. Moody's 
"loan payment" checks, which he was clear could not be cashed, acted as physical 
evidence of antecedent loans and a good faith promise to repay them when funds were 
available. 
In contrast with the defendant in Mower, who was in the business of providing 
loans for interest and collateral, Mr. Moody was not loaning money to Mr. Christensen. 
See 2005 UT App 438, f 14. Mr. Moody was not even attempting to discharge his own 
debt, as he clarified that he did not have the money to fund the checks. R. 194:125-26. He 
intended the checks as "good faith checks" in anticipation of making good on his 
antecedent debt. R. 194:124, 144-45. Mr. Moody could not have expected to acquire any 
money, any expectation of money, or any legal rights in exchange for the checks. Mr. 
Moody intended to obtain nothing, and his clarification that the checks were unfunded — 
and continuing statement that there were no funds available— was intended to prevent 
any misunderstanding or inconvenience to the recipients. 
Additionally, the marshaled evidence establishes that Mr. Moody did not intend to 
obtain anything of value from Wells Fargo. The jury instructions specify that Mr. Moody 
must have intended to obtain something of value from Wells Fargo: "1) That.. . Gary 
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Lee Moody, issued or passed a check or draft for the payment of money 2) For the 
purpose of obtaining from Wells Fargo, any money, property, or other thing of value, 
knowing it would not be paid by the drawee and payment was refused by the drawee . .." 
R. 168. Where there was no money in the account and Mr. Moody made that known to 
the Christensens by telling them not to cash the checks, the marshaled evidence is 
insufficient to prove that Mr. Moody intended for the Christensens to cash the checks or 
that he intended for Wells Fargo to honor them. 
Because Mr. Moody told Mr. Christensen that there was no money in the account, 
the checks acted as documentation of past loans and promises to pay in the future. The 
checks were not intended to mislead the Christensens into thinking that Mr. Moody had 
the funds to repay any future investments. There is no evidence indicating that the checks 
induced Mr. Christensen to loan Mr. Moody additional money and no evidence indicating 
that Mr. Moody thought the checks would be cashed by November 1, 2009—he 
repeatedly instructed that they be held. R. 194:125-28. Viewed in the light most favorable 
to the verdict, these candidly unfunded checks written for the purpose of providing a 
good faith promise to pay on an antecedent debt do not meet the classification of a quid 
pro quo exchange for something of value and thus issuing the checks to Mr. Christensen 
did not violate Utah Code section 76-6-505. This Court should reverse the conviction for 
issuing a bad check or draft. 
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II. THE TESTIMONY FROM MR. MOODY9 S PAROLE OFFICER, 
CASEY NELSON, WAS NOT RELEVANT TO THE ISSUES BEING 
DECIDED BY THE JURY AND WAS UNDULY PREJUDICIAL. 
Casey Nelson's testimony regarding Mr. Moody's previous conviction of a similar 
offense, current status as a parolee, violation of his parole when he borrowed investment 
money, failure to inform the parole officer of his involvement with the Medsonix device, 
and failure to make payments on the State's restitution order was not relevant to whether 
the Medsonix device existed or whether Mr. Moody borrowed money with the intent to 
deceive a vulnerable adult. Any minimal probative value was substantially outweighed by 
the prejudicial impact of this testimony. Because the erroneous admission of this 
testimony affected the outcome, a new trial is required. 
Because the "nature of an accused's relationship with his parole officer is not such 
that in most instances the former would view their interests as coextensive," evidence of 
the absence of certain conversations between a parolee and his officer, particularly 
conversations that would admit a violation of the probation agreement, are not relevant 
and not probative of credibility. Walker v. United States, 402 A.2d 424, 427 (D.C. 1979). 
This is because there can be no "inference that it would [be] natural for [the defendant] to 
explain" or discuss his actions to his parole officer. Id. (error to admit evidence that 
defendant did not discuss reasons for fleeing from a crime scene); see also United States 
v. Robertson. 19 F.3d 1318, 1324 (10th Cir. 1994) (evidence that defendant missed a 
meeting with his parole officer two days after the robbery was irrelevant and more 
prejudicial than probative under rule 403); Utah R. Evid. 401, 402, 403. Moreover, even 
if such evidence is probative, the evidence can be so prejudicial that any probative value 
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is outweighed by the prejudicial effect, requiring that it not be admitted. See United 
States v. Cole, 488 F. Supp. 2d 792, 805-06 (N.D. Iowa 2007) (evidence that defendant 
violated terms of parole violated rule 403 because of the "serious potential that the jurors 
might convict [the defendant] of the charged offenses for the unrelated reason that he 
violated the terms of his parole, not because of evidence showing that he committed the 
charged crimes"); Utah R. Evid. 403. Inviting the jury to make improper inferences from 
the defendant's inaction are likely to be over-valued by juries. See Burgess v. United 
States, 440 F.2d 226, 234 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (noting the "fictitious weight" juries tend to 
place on the absence of evidence). 
In Walker, the defendant was apprehended near the scene of a robbery. 402 A.2d 
at 425. The defense was innocent presence. Id, The defendant testified that he fled the 
scene, not because of a guilty mind, but because of the existence of an outstanding 
warrant against him. Id. at 425-27. He did not tell his parole officer his reasons for 
running because he did not want the parole officer to know about an outstanding 
probation warrant. Id In effort to show he committed the robbery, the State argued to the 
jury, "[d]on't you think he would have discussed [running from the scene] with his 
[parole] officer" if he had an innocent reason for running? Id at 426. The court held that 
it was error to admit evidence of the defendant's failure to inform his parole officer that 
he ran away from a crime scene, because "there is equally convincing reasoning 
supporting [an innocent] inference" and therefore the evidence was not probative of 
credibility or guilt. Id. at 427. 
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The trial court likewise erred in admitting the testimony in this case because it was 
not probative of the issues being decided by the jury, and even if it were, the testimony 
went beyond information that was relevant to the case and substantially prejudiced Mr. 
Moody. The trial court granted Mr. Moody's pretrial motion to exclude evidence of his 
prior conviction, R. 194:8, but denied his motion to exclude the testimony of Officer 
Nelson and motion for a mistrial following Mr. Nelson's testimony. R. 194:7, 178. The 
State's purpose for the admission of Officer Nelson's testimony was to show that Mr. 
Moody was deceiving Mr. Christensen. R. 194:213; see also R. 194:6 (during the pretrial 
motion to exclude the State indicated that it would use the testimony to show "[t]he 
absence of any knowledge by Mr. Nelson of a business relationship and employment 
relationship with a [Me]dsoni[x] company"). To prove the charge of exploiting a 
vulnerable adult, the State must show the accused 
is in a position of trust and confidence, or has a business relationship, with 
the vulnerable adult. . . and knowingly, by deception or intimidation, 
obtains or uses, or endeavors to obtain or use, the vulnerable adult's funds 
. . . with the intent to temporarily or permanently deprive the vulnerable 
adult of the use, benefit, or possession of the adult's property, for the 
benefit of someone other than the vulnerable adult. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-11 l(4)(a)(i) (Supp. 2007) (emphasis added). The State argued 
that Officer Nelson's testimony was relevant to whether a Medsonix device existed ztnd 
therefore whether Mr. Moody was deceiving Mr. Christensen. According to Mr. Nelson, 
Mr. Moody was supposed to report his employment and financial information to Mr. 
Nelson from March 2009 to November 2009. R. 194:174. Although Mr. Moody was 
receiving money from Mr. Christensen, according to Mr. Nelson's testimony, Mr. Moody 
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never reported any investments or discussed the Medsonix invention with him. R. 
194:175. Failure to report that he was involved with the Medsonix investment was 
therefore a violation of his probation. The State was attempting to suggest through this 
testimony that because Mr. Moody never mentioned the invention to Officer Nelson, the 
device did not exist. Id. 
Mr. Nelson also testified that one of the conditions of Mr. Moody's parole was 
"[n]ot to handle investment money." R. 194:175. Mr. Nelson testified that borrowing 
even twenty dollars and agreeing to pay it back with interest would constitute an 
investment that would violate Mr. Moody's parole terms. R. 194:179. The State also 
argued the testimony of Mr. Moody's failure to inform Mr. Christensen that he was on 
probation and not supposed to handle investment money was relevant because it 
illustrated Mr. Moody's intent to deceive. R. 194:202. 
Contrary to the State's argument, the testimony was not relevant. Evidence that 
Mr. Moody's parole conditions prohibited handling investment money and that Mr. 
Moody did not divulge the Medsonix investment to Mr. Nelson were not probative of 
whether Mr. Moody took Mr. Christensen's money with the intent to deceive him. Mr. 
Nelson's lack of knowledge regarding Mr. Moody's involvement with Medsonix did not 
make it less likely that Mr. Moody was borrowing money for the purpose of investing in 
Medsonix. Because Mr. Moody could have had other motivations for not telling Mr. 
2
 The State, however, failed to present sufficient evidence that the Medsonix device did 
not exist, or that the money Mr. Christensen loaned to Mr. Moody was not being used for 
the legitimate purposes of which Mr. Moody told Mr. Christensen they would be used. 
SeeR. 194:183-184. 
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Nelson about the Medsonix invention and his dealings with Mr. Christensen the evidence 
was not relevant. The "nature of an accused's relationship with his parole officer is not 
such that in most instances the former would view their interests as coextensive," and the 
absence of certain conversations between Mr. Moody and Officer Nelson, which would 
have been an admission that Mr. Moody was violating his parole agreement, is irrelevant 
and not probative of credibility because there can be no "inference that it would [be] 
natural" or in Mr. Moody's personal interest to explain his actions to Officer Nelson., See 
Walker, 402 A.2d at 427. Mr. Nelson's testimony that he had never heard of Medsonix 
was therefore not probative of any fact of consequence in the case. The State made the 
case that Mr. Moody was violating his parole but not that he was guilty of the charged 
offense. 
Finally, the State used Mr. Nelson's testimony to inform the jury that Mr. Moody 
owed $297,000 to the State and was delinquent on the payments. R. 194:177-78. When 
an inflammatory piece of evidence shows only what can be "put before the jury readily 
and accurately by other means not accompanied by the potential prejudice," admitting the 
inflammatory evidence constitutes an abuse of discretion. State v. Cloud, 722 P.2d 750, 
753 (Utah 1986) (citation and quotation marks omitted). The trial court determined that 
Mr. Moody's debt was relevant and the State could use in its case in chief "the amount of 
restitution that was due and owing under the terms of probation." R. 194:11. Mr. 
Nelson's testimony was unnecessary to convey this information to the jury. The State 
could have demonstrated that Mr. Moody was in debt without the testimony of Mr. 
Nelson. 
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Moreover, any minimal probative value the testimony had to the issues being 
decided by the jury, admission of such evidence can nevertheless be so prejudicial that 
the probative value is outweighed in violation of Rule 403. See Utah R. Evid. 403. The 
testimony went far beyond the purposes outlined by the State, and violated the trial courts 
order that no evidence of Mr. Moody's past conviction could come in. The court granted 
defense's in limine motion to exclude evidence of Mr. Moody's prior conviction in 
accordance with 404(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence, R. 85; 194:7, and noted that such 
evidence would be "unduly prejudicial." R. 194:9-10. However, the State elicited 
testimony that Mr. Nelson was Mr. Moody's parole officer and that Mr. Moody's 
conditions of parole included not taking investment money. Mr. Nelson explained that 
handling investment money might "put [Mr. Moody] in a position to re-offend to a 
similar crime." R. 194:176. Mr. Nelson further testified that Mr. Moody owed the state 
money for criminal restitution and that he violated his parole during the time of his 
alleged offenses. R. 194:175. 
The trial court erred in admitting the testimony in this case because it was not 
probative of the issues being decided by the jury, and even if it were, the testimony went 
beyond information that was relevant to the case and substantially prejudiced Mr. Moody. 
Mr. Nelson's testimony likely influenced the jury to base its verdict not on the evidence 
related to the charges but on Mr. Moody's criminal history and violation of his probation. 
The fact that a defendant was on parole: 
may [be] even more prejudicial than the jury's simple knowledge of his 
prior conviction of a felony. Parole suggests to the jury that the crime was 
recent and that it was one which required imprisonment. The knowledge 
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that [the defendant] was on parole at the time of the alleged offense could 
also arouse an emotional reaction among the jurors, especially those who 
harbor strong feelings about recidivism and the premature release of those 
in prison for crimes. 
United States v. Calhoun, 544 F.2d 291, 296 (6th Cir. 1976). The prosecution elicited 
testimony that involvement in investments would put Mr. Moody, a parolee, "in a 
position to re-offend to a similar crime." R. 194:176. The jury heard that Mr. Moody was 
on parole, that he violated his parole, and that his parole terms and high criminal 
restitution figure were the result of "a similar crime." R. 164:176. Mr. Nelson's assertions 
that he did not hear about the Medsonix device, that Mr. Moody was forbidden from 
handling investment money under the conditions of his parole, and that Mr. Moody was 
in debt had little probative value. There is a reasonable probability that without Mr. 
Nelson's prejudicial testimony, the jury would not have found that the prosecution met its 
burden of proof in this case. 
This error requires reversal because the improper references were not harmless 
based on the prejudicial nature of the information, see R. 194:9-10, and the fact that this 
type of error is presumed prejudicial. See Calhoun, 544 F.2d at 296; see also, State v. 
Saunders, 699 P.2d 738, 741 (Utah 1985) (evidence which exposed the jury to the 
defendant's status as an inmate, implying that the defendant had committed prior crimes, 
was presumed prejudicial). Absent Mr. Nelson's testimony, the State's evidence of 
deception focused on "the absurdity of the claim" that Mr. Christensen would get double 
his money back, the absence of a return on the investments, R. 194:201, and the defense's 
25 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
failure to produce "evidence . .. that this device even exists." R. 194:204. At most, the 
evidence establishes an unprofitable, failed business deal. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Moody requests that this Court reverse and remand with instructions to enter 
an acquittal for count two, issuing a bad check or draft, and remand for a new trial for 
count one, exploitation of a vulnerable adult. 
SUBMITTED this ^ _ day of V^ 2011. 
BRITTANY D. ENNISS 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
GARY LEE MOODY, 
Defendant. 
MINUTES 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 101900688 FS 
Judge: RANDALL SKANCHY 
Date: May 9, 2011 
PRESENT 
Clerk: saram 
Prosecutor: FERBRACHE, GREGORY N 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): WILSON, SCOTT A 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: September 21, 1952 
Video 
Tape Number: 12:19 
CHARGES 
1. EXPLOIT DISABLED OR ELDER ADULT W/INTENT, PROFIT <$5000 - 3rd 
Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 03/23/2011 Guilty 
2. ISSUING A BAD CHECK OR DRAFT - 3rd Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 03/23/2011 Guilty 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of EXPLOIT DISABLED OR ELDER 
ADULT W/INTENT, PROFIT <$5000 a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is 
sentenced to an indeterminate term of not to exceed five years in 
the Utah State Prison. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of ISSUING A BAD CHECK OR DRAFT 
a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate 
term of not to exceed five years in the Utah State Prison. 
To the SALT LAKE County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your 
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the 
defendant will be confined. 
SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE 
These charges are to run concurrent with each other, but 
consecutive to any other commitments previously serving. 
Restitution Amount: $3730.00 Plus Interest 
Pay in behalf of: VICTIM 
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Case No: 101900688 Date: May 09, 2011 
The restitution is to be sent to the Office of State Debt 
Collection. 
Date: T J A K ^ 
• * _ / * « • I '.•••• • 'V:i'Z 
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UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-111 (2008) 
§ 76-5-111. Abuse, neglect, or exploitation of a vulnerable acit ill Penalties 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "Abandonment5' means a knowing or intentional action or inaction, including 
desertion, by a person or entity acting as a caretaker for a vulnerable adult that leaves 
the vulnerable adult without the means or ability to obtain necessary food, clothing, 
shelter, or medical or other health care. 
(b) "Abuse" means: 
(i) attempting to cause harm, intentionally or knowingly causing harm, or 
intentionally or knowingly placing another in fear of imminent harm; 
(ii) causing physical injury by knowing or intentional acts or omissions; 
(iii) unreasonable or inappropriate use of physical restraint, medication, or isolation 
that causes or is likely to cause harm to a vulnerable adult that is in conflict with a 
physician's orders or used as an unauthorized substitute for treatment, unless that 
conduct furthers the health and safety of the adult; or 
(iv) deprivation of life-sustaining treatment, except: 
(A) as provided in Title 75, Chapter 2a, Advance Health Care Directive Act; or 
(B) when informed consent, as defined in this section, has been obtained. 
(c) "Business relationship" means a relationship between two or more individuals or 
entities where there exists an oral or written agreement for the exchange of goods or 
services. 
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( 
(d)(i) "Caretaker" means any person, entity, corporation, or public institution that 
assumes the responsibility to provide a vulnerable adult with care, food, shelter, 
clothing, supervision, medical or other health care, or other necessities. ( 
(ii) "Caretaker" includes a relative by blood or marriage, a household member, a 
person who is employed or who provides volunteer work, or a person who contracts 
or is under court order to provide care. < 
(e) "Deception" means: 
(i) a misrepresentation or concealment: i 
(A) of a material fact relating to services rendered, disposition of property, or use of 
property intended to benefit a vulnerable adult; 
i 
(B) of the terms of a contract or agreement entered into with a vulnerable adult; or 
(C) relating to the existing or preexisting condition of any property involved in a , 
contract or agreement entered into with a vulnerable adult; or 
(ii) the use or employment of any misrepresentation, false pretense, or false promise 
in order to induce, encourage, or solicit a vulnerable adult to enter into a contract or 
agreement. 
(f) "Elder adult" means a person 65 years of age or older. 
(g) "Endeavor" means to attempt or try. 
(h) "Exploitation" means an offense described in Subsection (4)or Section 76-5b-202. 
(i) "Harm" means pain, mental anguish, emotional distress, hurt, physical or 
psychological damage, physical injury, suffering, or distress inflicted knowingly or 
intentionally. 
(j) "Informed consent" means: 
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(i) a written expression by the person or authorized by the person, stating that the 
person fully understands the potential risks and benefits of the withdrawal of food, 
water, medication, medical services, shelter, cooling, heating, or other services 
necessary to maintain minimum physical or mental health, and that the person desires 
that the services be withdrawn. A written expression is valid only if the person is of 
sound mind when the consent is given, and the consent is witnessed by at least two 
individuals who do not benefit from the withdrawal of services; or 
(ii) consent to withdraw food, water, medication, medical services, shelter, cooling, 
heating, or other services necessary to maintain minimum physical or mental health, 
as permitted by court order. 
(k) "Intimidation" means communication conveyed through verbal or nonverbal 
conduct which threatens deprivation of money, food, clothing, medicine, shelter, social 
interaction, supervision, health care, or companionship, or which threatens isolation or 
harm. 
(l)(i) "Isolation" means knowingly or intentionally preventing a vulnerable adult from 
having contact with another person by: 
(A) preventing the vulnerable adult from receiving visitors, mail, or telephone calls, 
contrary to the express wishes of the vulnerable adult, including communicating to 
a visitor that the vulnerable adult is not present or does not want to meet with or 
talk to the visitor, knowing that communication to be false; 
(B) physically restraining the vulnerable adult in order to prevent the vulnerable 
adult from meeting with a visitor; or 
(C) making false or misleading statements to the vulnerable adult in order to induce 
the vulnerable adult to refuse to receive communication from visitors or other 
family members. 
(ii) The term "isolation" does not include an act intended to protect the physical or 
mental welfare of the vulnerable adult or an act performed pursuant to the treatment 
plan or instructions of a physician or other professional advisor of the vulnerable 
adult. 
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(m) "Lacks capacity to consent" means an impairment by reason of mental illness, 
developmental disability, organic brain disorder, physical illness or disability, chronic 
use of drugs, chronic intoxication, short-term memory loss, or other cause to the extent 
that a vulnerable adult lacks sufficient understanding of the nature or consequences of 
decisions concerning the adult's person or property. 
(n) "Neglect" means: 
(i) failure of a caretaker to provide nutrition, clothing, shelter, supervision, personal 
care, or dental or other health care, or failure to provide protection from health and 
safety hazards or maltreatment; 
(ii) failure of a caretaker to provide care to a vulnerable adult in a timely manner and 
with the degree of care that a reasonable person in a like position would exercise; 
(iii) a pattern of conduct by a caretaker, without the vulnerable adult's informed 
consent, resulting in deprivation of food, water, medication, health care, shelter, 
cooling, heating, or other services necessary to maintain the vulnerable adult's well 
being; 
(iv) intentional failure by a caretaker to carry out a prescribed treatment plan that 
results or could result in physical injury or physical harm; or 
(v) abandonment by a caretaker. 
(o) "Physical injury" includes damage to any bodily tissue caused by nontherapeutic 
conduct, to the extent that the tissue must undergo a healing process in order to be 
restored to a sound and healthy condition, or damage to any bodily tissue to the extent 
that the tissue cannot be restored to a sound and healthy condition. "Physical injury" 
includes skin bruising, a dislocation, physical pain, illness, impairment of physical 
function, a pressure sore, bleeding, malnutrition, dehydration, a burn, a bone fracture, a 
subdural hematoma, soft tissue swelling, injury to any internal organ, or any other 
physical condition that imperils the health or welfare of the vulnerable adult and is not 
a serious physical injury as defined in this section. 
(p) "Position of trust and confidence" means the position of a person who: 
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(i) is a parent, spouse, adult child, or other relative by blood or marriage of a 
vulnerable adult; 
(ii) is a joint tenant or tenant in common with a vulnerable adult; 
(iii) has a legal or fiduciary relationship with a vulnerable adult, including a 
court-appointed or voluntary guardian, trustee, attorney, or conservator; or 
(iv) is a caretaker of a \ i ill lerable adult. 
(q) "Serious physical injury" means any physical injury or set of physical injuries that: 
(i) seriously impairs a vulnerable adult's health; 
(ii) was caused by use of a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601; 
(iii) involves physical torture or causes serious emotiona1 < erable adult; 
or 
(iv) creates a reasonable risk of death. 
(r) "Undue influence" occurs when a person uses the person's role, relationship, or power 
to exploit, or knowingly assist or cause another to exploit, the trust, dependency, or fear 
of a vulnerable adult, or uses the person's role, relationship, or power to gain control 
deceptively over the decision making of the vulnerable adult. 
(s) "Vulnerable adult" means an elder adult, or an adult 18 years of age or older who has 
a mental or physical impairment which substantially affects that person's ability to: 
(i) provide personal protection; 
(ii) provide necessities such as food, shelter, clothing, or medical or other health care; 
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(iii) obtain services necessary for health, safety, or welfare; 
(iv) carry out the activities of daily living; 
(v) manage the adult's own resources; or 
(vi) comprehend the nature and consequences of remaining in a situation of abuse, 
neglect, or exploitation. 
(2) Under any circumstances likely to produce death or serious physical injury, any 
person, including a caretaker, who causes a vulnerable adult to suffer serious physical 
injury or, having the care or custody of a vulnerable adult, causes or permits that adult's 
person or health to be injured, or causes or permits a vulnerable adult to be placed in a 
situation where the adult's person or health is endangered, is guilty of the offense of 
aggravated abuse of a vulnerable adult as follows: 
(a) if done intentionally or knowingly, the offense is a second degree felony; 
(b) if done recklessly, the offense is third degree felony; and 
(c) if done with criminal negligence, the offense is a class A misdemeanor. 
(3) Under circumstances other than those likely to produce death or serious physical 
injury any person, including a caretaker, who causes a vulnerable adult to suffer harm, 
abuse, or neglect; or, having the care or custody of a vulnerable adult, causes or permits 
that adult's person or health to be injured, abused, or neglected, or causes or permits a 
vulnerable adult to be placed in a situation where the adult's person or health is 
endangered, is guilty of the offense of abuse of a vulnerable adult as follows: 
(a) if done intentionally or knowingly, the offense is a class A misdemeanor; 
(b) if done recklessly, the offense is a class B misdemeanor; and 
(c) if done with criminal negligence, the offense is a class C misdemeanor. 
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(4)(a) A person commits the offense of exploitation of a viilllerable adult who- >e 
person: 
(i) is in a position of trust and confidence, or has a business relationship, with the 
vulnerable adult or has undue influence over the vulnerable adult and knowingly, by 
deception or intimidation, obtains or uses, or endeavors to obtain or use, the 
vulnerable adult's funds, credit, assets, or other property with the intent to 
temporarily or permanently deprive the vulnerable adult of the use, benefit, or 
possession of the adult's property, for the benefit of someone other than the 
vulnerable adult; 
(ii) knows or should know that the vulnerable adult lacks the capacity to consent, and 
obtains or uses, or endeavors to obtain or use, or assists another in obtaining or using 
or endeavoring to obtain or use, the vulnerable adult's funds, assets, or property with 
the intent to temporarily or permanently deprive the vulnerable adult of the use, 
benefit, or possession of his property for the benefit of someone other than the 
vulnerable adult; 
(iii) unjustly or improperly uses or manages the resources of a vulnerable adult for the 
profit or advantage of someone other than the vulnerable adult; 
(iv) unjustly or improperly uses a vulnerable adult's power of attorney or 
guardianship for the profit or advantage of someone other than the vulnerable adult; 
or 
(v) involves a vulnerable adult who lacks the capacity to consent in the facilitation or 
furtherance of any criminal activity . 
(b) A person is guilty of the offense of exploitation of a vulnerable adult as follows: 
(i) if done intentionally or knowingly and the aggregate value of the resources used or 
the profit made is or exceeds $5,000, the offense is a second degree felony; 
(ii) if done intentionally or knowingly and the aggregate value of the resources used 
or the profit made is less than $5,000 or cannot be determined, the offense is a third 
degree felony; 
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(iii) if done recklessly, the offense is a class A misdemeanor; or 
(iv) if done with criminal negligence, the offense is a class B misdemeanor. 
(5) It does not constitute a defense to a prosecution for any violation of this section that 
the accused did not know the age of the victim. 
(6) An adult is not considered abused, neglected, or a vulnerable adult for the reason that 
the adult has chosen to rely solely upon religious, nonmedical forms of healing in lieu of 
medical care. 
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UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-505 
§ 76-6-505. Issuing a bad check or draft—Presumption 
(l)(a) Any person who issues or passes a check or draft for the payment of money, for the 
purpose of obtaining from any person, firm, partnership, or corporation, any money, 
property, or other thing of value or paying for any services, wages, salary, labor, or rent, 
knowing it will not be paid by the drawee and payment is refused by the drawee, is guilty 
of issuing a bad check or draft. 
(b) For purposes of this Subsection (1), a person who issues a check or draft for which 
payment is refused by the drawee is presumed to know the check or draft would not be 
paid if he had no account with the drawee at the time of issue. 
(2) Any person who issues or passes a check or draft for the payment of money, for the 
purpose of obtaining from any person, firm, partnership, or corporation, any money, 
property, or other thing of value or paying for any services, wages, salary, labor, or rent, 
payment of which check or draft is legally refused by the drawee, is guilty of issuing a 
bad check or draft if he fails to make good and actual payment to the payee in the amount 
of the refused check or draft within 14 days of his receiving actual notice of the check or 
draft's nonpayment. 
(3) An offense of issuing a bad check or draft shall be punished as follows: 
(a) If the check or draft or series of checks or drafts made or drawn in this state within a 
period not exceeding six months amounts to a sum that is less than $500, the offense is a 
class B misdemeanor. 
(b) If the check or draft or checks or drafts made or drawn in this state within a period not 
exceeding six months amounts to a sum that is or exceeds $500 but is less than $1,500, 
the offense is a class A misdemeanor. 
(c) If the check or draft or checks or drafts made or drawn in this state within a period not 
exceeding six months amounts to a sum that is or exceeds $1,500 but is less than $5,000, 
the offense is a felony of the third degree. 
(d) If the check or draft or checks or drafts made or drawn in this state within a period not 
exceeding six months amounts to a sum that is or exceeds $5,000, the offense is a second 
degree felony. 
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UTAH R. EVID. 401 
RULE 401. DEFINITION OF "RELEVANT EVIDENCE" 
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any 
fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less 
probable than it would be without the evidence. 
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UTAH R. EVID. 402 
RULE 402. RELEVANT EVIDENCE GENERALLY
 A D M 1 S S 1 B L E ; 
IRRELEVANT EVIDENCE INADMISSIBLE 
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the Constitution of 
the United States or the Constitution of the state of Utah, statute, or by these rules, or by 
other rules applicable in courts of this state. Evidence which is not relevant is not 
admissible. 
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UTAH R. EVID. 403 
RULE 403. EXCLUSION OF RELEVANT EVIDENCE ON GROUNDS OF 
PREJUDICE, CONFUSION, OR WASTE OF TIME 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially out-
weighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, 
or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumula-
tive evidence. 
Current with amendments received through July 1, 2009. 
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UTAH R. EVID. 404 
RULE 404. CHARACTER EVIDENCE NOT ADM1SS1BLL < >ROVE 
CONDUCT; EXCEPTIONS; OTHER CRIMES 
(a) Character evidence generally. Evidence of a person's character or a trait of 
character is not admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity therewith on a 
particular occasion, except: 
(a)(1) Character of accused. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character offered by an 
accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same, or if evidence of a trait of character of 
the alleged victim of the crime is offered by the accused and admitted under Rule 
404(a)(2), evidence of the same trait of character of the accused offered by the 
prosecution; 
(a)(2) Character of alleged victim. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character of the alleged 
victim of the crime offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same, or 
evidence of a character trait of peacefulness of the alleged victim offered by the 
prosecution in a homicide case to rebut evidence that the alleged victim was the first 
aggressor; 
(a)(3) Character of witness. Evidence of the character of a witness, as provided HI HWW> 
607, 608, and 609. 
^ other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not 
admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity 
therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, 
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or 
accident, provided that upon request by the accused, the prosecution in a criminal case 
shall provide reasonable notice in advance of trial, or during trial if the court excuses 
pretrial notice on good cause shown, of the nature of any such evidence it intends to 
introduce at trial. 
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(c) Evidence of similar crimes in child molestation cases. 
(c)(1) In a criminal case in which the accused is charged with child molestation, evidence 
of the commission of other acts of child molestation may be admissible to prove a 
propensity to commit the crime charged provided that the prosecution in a criminal case 
shall provide reasonable notice in advance of trial, or during trial if the court excuses 
pretrial notice on good cause shown, of the nature of any such evidence it intends to 
introduce at trial. 
(c)(2) For purposes of this rule "child molestation" means an act committed in relation to 
a child under the age of 14 which would, if committed in this state, be a sexual offense or 
an attempt to commit a sexual offense. 
(c)(3) Rule 404(c) does not limit the admissibility of evidence otherwise admissible under 
Rule 404(a), 404(b), or any other rule of evidence. 
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. LOHRA L. MILLER 
District Attorney for Salt Lake County 
ALICIA COOK, Bar No. 8851 
Deputy District Attorney 
111 EAST BROADWAY, SUITE #400 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801)363-7900 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
GARY LEE MOODY 
DOB: 09/21/1952, 
AKA: NONE 
14425 Bitterbrush Lane 
Draper, UT 84020 
OTN 
SO# 0224122 
Defendant. 
STEVEN RICHARD MOODY 
DOB 01/12/1951 
Co-Defendant 
Assigned to: ALICIA COOK (Thursday) 
DAO# 10001963 
AMENDED 
INFORMATION 
Case No. 101900688 
Co-DefDAO #10001962 
The undersigned Deputy District Attorney upon a written affidavit states on information 
and belief that the defendant, GARY LEE MOODY, committed the crime of: 
COUNT 1 
EXPLOITATION OF A DISABLED OR ELDER ADULT, 524 76-5-111 (4)(b)(ii) UCA, third 
degree felony, as follows: That on or about March 1, 2009 through December 31, 2009, at 1733 
Siesta Drive, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah the defendant (i) was in a position of trust and 
confidence, or had a business relationship, with the disabled or elder adult and intentionally or 
knowingly, by deception or intimidation, obtained or used, or endeavored to obtain or use, the 
disabled or elder adult's funds, credit, assets, or other property with the intent to temporarily or 
permanently deprive the disabled or elder adult of the use, benefit, or possession of his property, 
for the benefit of someone other than the disabled or elder adult; 
(ii) knew or should have known that the disabled or elder adult lacked the capacity to consent, 
and intentionally or knowingly obtained or used, or endeavored to obtain or use, or assisted 
another in obtaining or using or endeavoring to obtain or use, the disabled or elder adult's funds, 
assets, or property with the intent to temporarily or permanently deprive the disabled or elder 
'nird Judicial District 
DeDutv Clerk 
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adult of the use, benefit, or possession of his property for the benefit of someone other than the 
disabled or elder adult; 
(iii) intentionally or knowingly used or managed the resources of a disabled or elder adult for the 
profit or advantage of someone other than the disabled or elder adult in an unjust or improper 
manner; 
(iv) intentionally or knowingly used a disabled or elder adult's power of attorney or guardianship 
for the profit or advantage of someone other than the disabled or elder adult in an unjust or 
improper manner; 
(v) intentionally or knowingly involved a disabled or elder adult who lacked the capacity to 
consent in the facilitation or furtherance of any criminal activity; or 
(vi) intentionally or knowingly committed sexual exploitation of a disabled or elder adult. The 
aggregate value of the resources used or profit made is less than $5,000. 
COUNT 2 
ISSUING A BAD CHECK OR DRAFT, 377 76-6-505(1) UCA, third degree felony, as follows: 
That on or about August 15, 2009 through August 17, 2009 at 1733 Siesta Drive, in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah the defendant issued or passed a check or draft for the payment of money, 
for the purpose of obtaining from Wells Fargo, any money, property, or other thing of value, or 
for the purpose of paying for any services, wages, salary, labor, or rent, knowing it would not be 
paid by the drawee and payment was refused by the drawee, and the check or draft or checks or 
drafts made or drawn in this state within a period not exceeding six months amounts to a sum 
that was or exceeded $1,000 but was less than $5,000. 
THIS INFORMATION IS BASED ON EVIDENCE OBTAINED FROM THE FOLLOWING 
WITNESSES: 
Grant Christensen, Jeanne Christensen, Casey Nelson 
AFFIDAVIT OF PROBABLE CAUSE: 
Your affiant bases this Information upon the following: 
The statement of Adult Probation and Parole Officer C. Nelson that on January 6, 2010 
he spoke to Jeanne Christensen, DOB: 10/3/1933, who stated her husband, Grant Christensen, 
DOB: 2/28/1923, was solicited by the defendant's here STEVEN MOODY and GARY MOODY 
approximately four years ago to invest in a "sonic invention." Mr. Christensen initially gave the 
defendants $500.00. The Christensen's did not hear anything from the defendants until March of 
2009. From March 2009 until December 2009 the defendant's persuaded Mr. Christensen to 
give them an additional $3,730.00 stating the needed to pay lawyers and bank fees. 
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The defendant's told the Christensen's they would pay a portion of the money back and 
completed a promissory note. In August 2009 GARY MOODY wrote two checks to the Mr. 
Christensen. When the Christensen's attempted to cash the checks the bank told them the 
account was closed and there had never been any money in the account. 
Officer Nelson spoke with STEVEN MOODY who stated GARY MOODY was 
soliciting funds from Grant Christensen for the sonic invention. STEVEN MOODY admitted 
accompanying GARY MOODY four times when he met with Mr. Christensen to get money. 
STEVEN MOODY stated he took money from Mr. Christensen in December 2009 stating it was 
needed to pay legal and business expenses. STEVEN MOODY further stated he spent the 
money on personal expenses. 
Pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 46-5-101 
(2007) I declare under criminal penalty of the State 
of Utah that the foregoing is true and correct to the 
best of my belief and knowledge. 
Executed on: <//, b f6 
Affiant 
Authorized for presentment and filing 
LOHRA L. MILLER, District Attorney 
Dep|U|y District Attorney 
2nd day of April, 2010 
EG/GAM/DAO# 10001963 
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